Siphoning of ship fuel/oil is not a new trend, but the frequency of such incidents has escalated since April 2014. A total of 15 incidents of siphoning of ship fuel/oil had been reported onboard oil/product tankers in Asia in 2014, of which 12 incidents of siphoning were carried out, and three incidents were not successful.
The ReCAAP ISC was concern and has been working closely with the shipping industry, governmental agencies, international organisations and ReCAAP Focal Points in sharing latest situation updates, case studies for purpose of highlighting best practices and sharing of lessons learned, encouraging pro-active actions by respective agencies in addressing the situation collectively. Some of the efforts undertaken by the ReCAAP ISC thus far are articulated as follows:
a. With Shipping Companies. The ReCAAP ISC has been engaging shipping companies, including conduct of operational visits to companies whose vessels had been boarded for siphoning of fuel/oil. Such visits allowed the ReCAAP ISC to gather first-hand information about the incidents, particularly the modus operandi of the perpetrators which enable us in making more accurate analysis. It also fostered trust and strengthened the cooperation
between the ReCAAP ISC and the shipping industry in timely reporting and information sharing.
b. With Shipping Associations. Under the cooperative arrangement between the ReCAAP ISC and the Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF), the ReCAAP ISC had participated and provided situation updates and assessments of incidents involving siphoning of ship fuel/oil to the shipping associations, including at the quarterly Singapore Shipping Association (SSA) Maritime Safety and Security Sub-Committee meetings, at the 23rd ASF General Meeting
in Otsu, Japan on 19-21 May 2014 and at the 27th Interim meeting of the ASF Safe Navigation & Environment Committee (SNEC) in Shanghai, China on 19 Sep 14.
Generally, the modus operandi of the perpetrators in most of the siphoning incidents was fairly similar. Refer to Annex A on incidents involving siphoning of fuel/oil during 2011-2014. The perpetrators were interested in the manifest of fuel/oil onboard the vessel; and had no intention to hijack the vessel or kidnap the crew. Upon boarding the vessel, they tied the crew and locked them in the cabin, steered the vessel to another location to conduct the siphoning onto another vessel which would come alongside. After completion of the siphoning, the perpetrators would destroy the vessel’s communication and navigation equipment, stole the crew’s cash and personal belongings before leaving the vessel. The crew was not harmed and there was no report of violence involved. Refer to the Annex B on the modus operandi of the 12 incidents of siphoning which are summarised below:
a. Size of Vessel. Of the 12 incidents, majority involved tankers of less than 2000 GT. Seven incidents involved tankers between 1000-2000 GT, two incidents involved tankers of 2148 GT and 2223 GT, one incident involved a tanker of 3238 GT, one incident involved a tanker of 4080 GT and one incident involved a tanker of 5153 GT.
b. Time of Incident. All boardings occurred during hours of darkness, with nine boardings took place between 2000-2345 hrs, two between 0055-0205 hrs, and one at 0600 hrs.
c. Duration the Perpetrators were onboard Vessels. It varied from case to case, and likely involved different groups of perpetrators although it may be the same for some incidents due to the similarity in modus operandi. Of the nine incidents with reports on the duration the perpetrators remained onboard the vessels; six incidents involved the perpetrators onboard the vessels for estimated 6-10 hours, and two incidents for estimated 4-5 hours. However, in the incident involving Srikandi 515, the owner ‘lost’ the tanker for 49 days (9 Oct-27 Nov 14). Investigation is ongoing as to what happened to the vessel during this period.
d. Number of Perpetrators. Of the 12 incidents, six involved 8-10 perpetrators, three involved 5-7 perpetrators, one involved 16 perpetrators and two involved 25-26 perpetrators.
e. Weapons. Majority of the incidents involved the perpetrators armed with knives and firearms (such as guns, handguns, pistols). Of the 12 incidents, eight reported that the perpetrators were armed with knives and firearms. Notably, there was no report of the firearms being discharged.
f. Treatment of Crew. In most of the incidents, the crew was tied and locked in the mess room or engine control room when the perpetrators steered the vessel to the South China Sea to carry out siphoning. The crew was not injured in most of the incidents except for minor injury sustained by the crew in two incidents; namely onboard Sri Phangnga and Sunrise 689.
g. Action by the Crew. Of the 12 incidents, SSAS was activated in four incidents, of which the maritime enforcement agencies responded to three incidents, namely Ai Maru on 14 Jun 14 (where six warships from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore were deployed), Oriental Glory on 16 Jul 14 (where KD Trengganu from the Royal Malaysian Navy was deployed), and Suratchanya on 15 Oct 14 (where three vessels from the Indonesian Navy were reportedly deployed).
Implications
12. Various types of fuel/oil had been siphoned, although majority of the incidents targeted MGO as it is relatively more costly and therefore in greater demand. The other types of fuel/oil being targeted were Marine Diesel Oil (MDO), Automotive Diesel Fuel (ADF), Diesel, Marine Fuel Oil (MFO) and Lube Oil.
13. Illegal siphoning of fuel/oil has become a lucrative business owing to the market price and taxes imposed on fuel/oil. With continued demand for fuel/oil in underground markets, siphoning incidents are here to stay. As such, the ReCAAP ISC strongly urges the littoral States and shipping industry to adopt a more concrete and robust response to address this problem collectively. A drop in the price of oil is likely to bring about a decline in its market price. However, whether this will dampen demand for fuel/oil in the underground market remains to be seen.
14. Illegal selling of fuel/oil in pursue of greater profits by culprits who may compromise on the quality of fuel/oil. For those who seek to buy cheaper fuel/oil, they may not be too concern about the inferior quality of fuel/oil that may affect the engine of their vessel, and possible pollution or environmental concerns that may arise in the event of collision or oil spillage.
Risk Assessments
15. With increase in the number of siphoning incidents in the region in 2014, shipping companies are facing the challenges in ensuring the safety of not only the manifest they carried but most importantly the safety and security of their crew. Hence, it is important for ship owners and master to be apprised of the latest situation and locations with relatively high number of incidents. This is to give them the option of avoiding the route (if possible), but if not, to exercise high level of vigilance when passing through the location. Based on the case studies done by the ReCAAP ISC, the timing of boarding by perpetrators and the appearance of another tanker to come alongside the victim vessel seemed to be more than coincidental. It is obvious that the perpetrators have knowledge of the manifest carried onboard the tanker, its route and schedule. It is therefore important for shipping company to maintain confidentiality on the type of manifest, the vessel’s intended route and schedule.
Recommendations
16. Preparedness and pro-active action by shipping companies are fundamental to the prevention of this illegal activity; and amongst the key recommendations by the ReCAAP ISC are: enhanced vigilance while underway and conduct of risk assessments, and timely reporting. Amongst other countermeasures adopted, the ReCAAP ISC recommends the following:
a. Conduct maritime risk analysis including threat profiling to determine potential threat in the area, identify the locations vulnerable to boarding by pirates/robbers, assess the risk involved in the route taken and formulate security plan based on the analysis;
b. Coordinate and inform maritime enforcement agency in the area of the planned voyage specifically if the route to be taken is vulnerable to boarding or had occurrence of boarding before;
c. Conduct regular crew’s background check, and mindful of the crew’s activities onboard the ship and ashore;
d. Review the composition of master and crew (if possible) in the event that the same person or group of crew was involved in previous piracy or armed robbery incidents; and
e. Preserve and collect evidence after boarding for investigation purpose. Refer to Annex C for the IMO guidelines on “preservation and collection of evidence following an allegation of a serious crime having taken place onboard a ship or following a report of a missing person from a ship, and pastoral and medical care of persons affected”.
17. The ReCAAP ISC notes that there is a dire need to strengthen national coordination among the littoral States through their respective enforcement agencies to curb illegal siphoning activities. In response, more need to be done by the littoral States such as enhancing existing joint coordinated patrols by the littoral states (which is currently ongoing in SOMS) to SCS to maintain presence. To display a strong commitment and determination to clamp down illegal siphoning activities in this region, the littoral States may consider joint patrols and surveillance in the SCS to apprehend perpetrators in action in order to serve as deterrence. The ReCAAP ISC recommends the littoral States to examine the following:
a. Formulate standing procedures among enforcement agencies in the region to facilitate the planning of combined operations and to coordinate effective response to piracy/armed robbery incidents, including when suspicious entities were involved.
b. Exhaust the possibilities of utilising intelligence units of enforcement agencies by conducting combined covert enforcement operations to gather information about groups involved in siphoning activities, their mastermind, affiliates and ‘blacklist’ companies that sell illegally siphoned fuel/oil;
c. Establish a composite special task force or group from the Navy, Maritime Police, Air Force and other maritime enforcement agencies to conduct regular maritime presence in locations of concern;
d. Establish a legal framework to facilitate and enhance effective prosecution of the arrested perpetrators.
Conclusion
18. The ReCAAP ISC reiterates the need for collective and shared responsibilities among all concerned entities to deal and tackle with this maritime crime. On this note, the ReCAAP ISC strongly encourages ship master and crew to exercise enhanced counter-piracy measures and report all incidents to the nearest coastal State immediately; ship owners/agents to review its crew, manpower and information structure to minimise/eradicate insider’s involvements; and urges the littoral enforcement agencies to beef up its surveillance efforts and activate timely responses when incidents were reported to them.
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Reports/2015/Special%20Report%20on%20Siphoning%20Part%20II%20(9%20Jan%2015).pdf
Source: RECAAP