The war in Gaza is reshaping the politics of the Middle East. Negotiations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia toward increased security commitments in exchange for the diplomatic recognition of Israel are ongoing but have become more difficult after October 7th. A path toward Palestinian statehood will remain a roadblock with the current Israeli government. However, a US-Saudi security accord with Israel added later could be possible under a new Israeli government coalition.

US-Saudi Negotiations Continue But Palestinian State Remains a Sticking Point

The war in Gaza and the war by Iran and its proxies against Israel and Israel’s western supporters is reshaping the politics of the Middle East. However, in addition to the violent reshaping, negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have been continuing on agreements that could affect the region in a profound way. The negotiations build upon the Abraham accords from the Trump administration, linking greater U.S. security commitments to Gulf Arab states to their diplomatic recognition of Israel. One purpose of the accords, and the current negotiations with Saudi Arabia, is to shore up an anti-Iran coalition. The other is to normalize politics in the region, at least between Israel and the majority of Arab states.

The issue in the wake of October 7 and Israel’s current war with Hamas, is that Saudi Arabia requires that Israel agree to a pathway to some future Palestinian state with a reformed Palestinian Authority playing some part in it. An agreement without such a move might have been workable prior to October 7, but Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel now seems impossible without that reciprocal move on the creation of a Palestinian state. What might be possible is a U.S.-Saudi accord with Israel invited to join later — under a new government.

The entire idea of a U.S.-Saudi formal security accord is a vast departure from past practice. Since the origins of U.S.-Saudi relations that began with President Roosevelt meeting King Saud on the deck of the USS Quincy in 1945, the relationship has been conducted largely through unwritten agreements and personal relations at the very top. Even in the wake of Operations Desert Shield and Storm in 1991, Saudi Arabia refused to formalize much of the working relationships that had been built between Washington and Riyadh. The exact shape of this potential future accord in terms of U.S. law remains unclear. It could be an executive agreement, but some reporting indicates that it could take the form of a treaty, meaning that it would require a two-thirds vote of approval by the U.S. Senate – something that seems like a far stretch given both the current partisan divide in the United States and the polarization that the Israel-Hamas war has exacerbated. Some commentators have opined that such an agreement could occur only if Saudi Arabia formally recognized Israel and established diplomatic relations. Again, though, this would require Israel to make commitments to a future Palestinian state, something that is essentially impossible given Israel’s current governing coalition.

The causes of this change in the U.S.-Saudi relationship are twofold. First, the current Saudi government, largely consisting of the next generation of the Crown Prince, feels much less concerned about domestic opposition to more formal ties with the United States. This may simply be a generational change, or it could be increased confidence on the part of the Crown Prince that he can control any potential opposition. The second is that Iran’s military capabilities, including its nuclear capabilities, have ramped up substantially, particularly since the Trump administration’s withdraw from the nuclear accord with Iran. The result could be a two-step agreement. The first step might be a U.S.-Saudi agreement – perhaps something short of a treaty in U.S. terms – that increases defense ties, provides U.S. support for the Saudi civil nuclear energy industry, and provides for closer cooperation on emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. The second step, if an Israeli government were willing, would be a Saudi recognition of Israel in exchange for some Israeli statement and steps towards a Palestinian state. For the U.S., another gain is Saudi reductions in commercial interactions with China.
Source: ESAI Energy